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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
: Case No. 
-vs-
: 
JON C. VASILACOPULOS, PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 
: NO. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty pleas to three felony by deception counts? 
A. Did the record as a whole demonstrate the trial 
court's compliance with Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-ll(e)) when it accepted 
defendant's pleas to three felony counts of theft by deception? 
B. Did the defendant's request for concurrent 
sentences at the sentencing hearing and his extensive delay in 
raising the Rule 11 argument demonstrate that the defendant 
understood the consecutive sentence possibility at the time he 
entered his pleas to three felony counts of theft by deception? 
C. Did the defendant satisfy his burden of showing 
good cause why he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty 
pleas? 
D. Did the Court of Appeals misinterpret and misapply 
this Court's Rule 11(e) precedents? 
COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION 
The Court of Appeals' opinion, of which petitioner 
State of Utah seeks review, is State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 
92 (Utah App. 1988) . 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner State of Utah seeks review of the Utah Court 
of Appeals' decision entered June 3, 1988. The State's Petition 
for Rehearing was denied July 19, 1988. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(5). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutory provisions are reproduced in 
full in the Appendix to this Petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case. The defendant was charged 
with second degree felony theft on November 13, 1981 (R. 67). 
The Information was subsequently amended, charging the defendant 
with 20 felony counts of theft by deception (R. 81-86). The 
defendant pleaded guilty to three of those counts on February 17, 
1984. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS 
Following defendant's plea but before sentencing, 
defendant fled from Utah, and was arrested on August 5, 1985 (R. 
156). He was sentenced on August 12, 1985, to serve consecutive 
terms of incarceration in the Utah State Prison (R. 157). 
Defendant moved for reconsideration of his sentence in 
November, 1985 (R. 168-169), but did not assert any failure of 
the trial court nor request to withdraw his pleas of guilty at 
that time. He petitioned for habeas corpus relief in June, 1986 
(R. 2-10 [V v. D]), for resentencing in February, 1987 (R. 202-
207), and filed a Motion to Withdraw his plea in September, 1987 
(R. 345-424). Each of these motions or petitions was denied or 
dismissed by the trial court (R. 185, 199-204 [V v. D], 325 and 
455). 
The defendant failed to assert that he entered his plea 
involuntarily as a result of lack of information until the habeas 
corpus petition of June 1986, more than two years after his 
guilty plea in February, 1984. 
The record in this case was not fully designated by the 
defendant and a supplemental designation was required (R. 4 72-
473). A portion of that supplemented record was renumbered, 
rather than continuing with the next number from the original 
record. Citations to the record such as (R. 2-10 [V v. D]) mean 
that portion of the record consisting of a folder designed 
Vasilacopulos v. Deland pages 1-225 and three transcript folders 
designated pages 226, 227 and 228 respectively. All other record 
designations without the [V v. D] indication are to the remainder 
of the record consisting of R. 1-473. 
_**_ 
The defendant appealed the trial court's ruling and on 
June 3, 1988, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, 
vacated the defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the 
trial court. The State's Petition for Rehearing was denied on 
July 19, 1988, and the Court of Appeals issued an Order for Stay 
of Remittitur on July 21, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Jon C. Vasilacopulos, was charged with 
second degree felony theft on November 13, 1981 (R. 67). The 
Information was subsequently amended, charging the defendant in 
the Second Amended Information with twenty counts of theft by 
deception (R. 81-86). 
Preliminary hearing was held in Fifth Circuit Court on 
November 22 and 30, 1982 and January 31, February 2, May 16 and 
17, 1983. Defendant was represented by counsel throughout his 
preliminary hearing and was bound over for trial in Third 
District Court (R. 5-6) on 18 of the 20 theft by deception counts 
(R. 92). Defendant was arraigned on July 18, 1983, and through 
counsel received a copy of the "complaint", waived reading 
thereof, and entered a plea of not guilty to the 18 counts of 
theft by deception (R. 92). 
The defendant appeared before the trial court on 
February 17, 1984, and entered pleas of guilty to Counts 6, 9, 
and 13 of the Second Amended Information (R. 93). 
At the time of the plea, the defendant and his counsel 
Ronald J. Yengich, executed an "Affidavit of Defendant," waiving 
constitutional rights, acknowledging guilt and affirming the 
voluntariness of the Defendant's plea of guilty (R. 109-110). 
Subsequently, the defendant was uncooperative with 
Adult Probation and Parole investigators who reported him as 
missing two appointments for psychological evaluations and 
failing to make himself available for further interviews with the 
investigator preparing the presentence report (R. 114), 
necessitating a continuance of the sentencing (R. 115). 
Defendant failed to appear for sentencing, and on 
October 3, 1984, a no-bail bench warrant was issued for the 
arrest of the defendant (R. 118-119, 123). The defendant was 
arrested on August 5, 1985, nearly 18 months after his plea of 
guilty (R. 156). 
On August 12, 1985, the defendant was sentenced (R. 
157-159). Defendant's sentences on the three counts to which he 
pleaded guilty were ordered by the Court to run consecutively (R. 
157-159 and R. 342, p. 8). 
On November 14, 1985, the defendant asked the trial 
court to reconsider his consecutive sentences and modify them to 
run concurrently. No mention was made in this motion about 
withdrawal of his plea, or that he had entered his plea 
involuntarily or without adequate information (R. 168-169). This 
Motion was supplemented on February 5, 1986, with information 
regarding the defendant's activities at the Utah State Prison (R. 
171-181)
 # but again contained no claim of involuntariness or lack 
of information concerning that plea. This motion was denied 
March 28, 1986. (R. 185). 
On June 18, 1986, the defendant filed a habeas corpus 
petition in Third District Court asking for post conviction 
relief from his guilty plea (R. 2-10 [V v. D]), for the first 
time asserting his lack of an informed plea. This petition was 
dismissed without prejudice on September 10, 1987, the trial 
court ruling that the defendant had not exhausted his available 
remedies. (R. 202 [V v. D]). 
The defendant, appearing pro se, filed a Motion for 
Resentencing on February 24, 1987 (R. 202-206), more than three 
years after his plea of guilty. The defendant claimed that Rule 
11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure had been violated 
and that he was not fully aware of the consequences of a plea of 
guilty (R. 277-279). This Motion was denied on May 1, 1987 (R. 
325). 
Subsequently, the defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw 
his guilty plea on September 15, 1987 (R. 345-424). This motion 
was denied by the Court on October 2, 1987 (R. 455). Defendant's 
appeal to the Court of Appeals followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A Writ of Certiorari should be granted pursuant to Rule 
43(2) of the Rules of this Court inasmuch as the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is in conflict with the holdings of this Court. 
The facts of the case when viewed in their totality demonstrate 
that the defendant was fully aware of the consequences of his 3 
pleas of guilty to the felony theft by deception charges. Those 
facts also show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED 
AND MISAPPLIED THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS 
IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 provides: 
A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time 
prior to conviction. A plea of guilty . . . may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of 
court. (Emphasis added.) 
Obviously a request to withdraw a plea of guilty is not 
automatically or mandatorily granted, but is granted only upon a 
showing of good cause and with leave of the court. This Court 
has held that Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 permits the trial 
court to exercise its sound discretion when ruling upon attempts 
by defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas. 
This Court recently addressed this issue in State v. 
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422 (Utah 1987): 
We will not interfere with a trial judge's 
determination that a defendant has failed to show good 
cause unless it clearly appears that the trial judge 
abused his discretion. State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 
339 (Utah 1977). We find no abuse of discretion here. 
Defendant has failed to show good cause why the court 
should have exercised its discretion to allow 
withdrawal of the plea. Defendant entered his guilty 
plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and with 
the advice of counsel. 
Id. at 424. This Court in State v. Forsyth, supra, said: 
-7_ 
We recognize, of course, that it is the duty of 
the trial court to see that the interests of justice 
are served by not allowing a person to enter a plea of 
guilty to a crime he has not committed. In performing 
that duty, the court is not bound to any rigidity of 
rule or procedure, but may do it in any manner 
consistent with reason and fairness which he thinks 
will best accomplish that purpose. 
Id. at 339 (emphasis added). 
This Court also addressed this issue in State v. Yeck, 
566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977); 
Once a plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily 
entered, there are no issues for trial. Where, as 
here, the plea of guilty is entered apparently in a 
plea bargaining deal, there is no compelling reason to 
permit it to be withdrawn by the accused. It is a 
matter lying entirely within the discretion of the 
trial court and the denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea will be reversed on appeal only when an 
abuse of discretion is shown on the part of the trial 
jud^e. 
Id. at 1249 (emphasis added). 
The facts surrounding the defendant's pleas of guilty 
demonstrate that they were knowingly and voluntarily entered, and 
that the defendant understood the consequences of his pleas of 
guilty. Further, the defendant failed to show why the denial of 
his Motion to Withdraw was an abuse of discretion. 
On February 17, 1984, the defendant appeared with 
counsel before the Court to enter his pleas of guilty. He 
pleaded guilty to Counts 6, 9, and 13 of the Second Amended 
Information (R. 93). This guilty plea is set forth at R. 340, 
the twelve-page transcript of the entry of the plea. 
The transcript of the February 17, 1984, hearing 
demonstrates substantial compliance by the trial court at the 
time of receipt of defendant's guilty plea with the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-ll(e) (Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure) and Rule 3.6 of the Rules of Practice of 
District and Circuit Courts, set forth in the Appendix. 
The Court of Appeals' decision reversing the 
Defendant's convictions was based on their determination that the 
trial court did not find that the defendant understood the 
possibility of consecutive sentences. 
However, the Affidavit signed by defendant indicates in 
a number of places his complete understanding of the 
ramifications of his plea. For example, this statement is from 
the beginning of the Affidavit (R. 109-110): 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. 
I am represented by Attorney Ron Yengich and Steve 
McCaughey who has explained my rights to me and I 
understand them. 
Paragraph 8 of the same Affidavit provides: 
I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of 
guilty does not mean that the Judge will not impose 
either a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and 
no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what 
the sentence will be. (Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph 10 of the Affidavit provides: 
I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read 
to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its 
contents. I am 26 years of age, have attended school 
through the High School and I can read and understand 
the English language. 
The fact that the defendant had counsel at the time of 
his plea has been held to be a significant factor when 
considering whether the trial court has abused its discretion in 
refusing to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea. In 
Guqlielmetti v. Turner, 496 P.2d 261 (Utah 1972), this Court 
ruled on a claim by the defendant that his guilty plea had not 
been voluntary. The Court rejected this claim and held: 
He was represented by one of the foremost 
attorneys in the practice of criminal law in this 
state, and when a defendant enters a plea of guilty 
upon the advice of a competent attorney, the plea is 
deemed to be intelligently entered. 
Id. at 262. The Court also observed: 
This appellant knew full well that a prison 
sentence was a possibility when he entered his plea of 
guilty to the charge against him, and it is 
inconceivable that he was not advised by his lawyer 
what the consequences of the plea might be. 
Id. at 263. 
The circumstances set forth in Guglielmetti, supra, are 
consistent with the facts in this case. The defendant was 
represented by two of the foremost attorneys in the practice of 
criminal law in the state and it is inconceivable that the 
defendant was not advised what the consequences of the plea might 
be. 
The holding in Guqlielmetti, supra, has been cited with 
approval by this Court in Lindeman v. Morris, 641 P.2d 133 (Utah 
1982), and Moxley v. Morris, 655 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982). In the 
Lindeman case, the Court said: 
The validity of the plea is further bolstered by 
the appellant's acknowledgment that it was decided upon 
with the full advice of competent counsel. 
Id. at 135. 
The defendant executed a Memorandum Agreement (R. 103-
108), which became incorporated in the plea Affidavit (R. 109-
110). The following appears on the first page of the Agreement 
(R. 103): 
The State of Utah, by and through . . . and the 
defendant with the advice and agreement of counsel 
Ronald J. Yengich and Stephen R. McCaughey, hereby 
agree on certain conditions for the guilty pleas by 
defendant . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
This advice, together with the defendant's execution of 
the Affidavit (R. 109-110) and the trial court's thorough 
questioning of the defendant at the time he pleaded guilty (R. 
340), demonstrates that the defendant was fully informed of the 
nature of the charges against him, and of the consequences of his 
plea. 
If the defendant had any questions or misunderstandings 
about any aspect of the plea, he failed to raise them at the time 
of his plea. 
As noted above, the defendant failed to appear at his 
scheduled sentencing (R. 118-119, 123), and was arrested on 
August 5, 1985, nearly 18 months after his guilty plea (R. 156). 
At the time of sentencing on August 12, 1985, the 
defendant's attorney indicated that the presentence report 
recommended consecutive sentences (R. 342, pp. 2-3) and the State 
recommended the imposition of consecutive sentences (R. 342, p. 
5). When the defendant spoke in his own behalf at sentencing, 
after hearing these recommendations, he had no questions or 
comments regarding sentencing (R. 342, p. 6). Additionally, the 
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defendant obviously would have had access to the presentence 
report, yet made no reference in his comments nor asked any 
questions to the court about consecutive sentencing. 
With respect to the question of consecutive sentences, 
paragraph 7 of the Affidavit read as follows: 
I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I 
have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in consecutive 
sentences being imposed on me. 
It might be argued that paragraph 7 is not applicable 
to the circumstances of defendant's pleas. Nevertheless, 
paragraph 7 does discuss the possibility of consecutive 
sentences, the defendant did plead guilty to multiple offenses 
and he has failed to explain why, if he was really unaware of the 
possibility of consecutive sentences# he failed to ask any 
questions about it at the time of the plea or at the time of 
sentencing. In fact, the transcript of the plea makes clear that 
defendant understood the Affidavit. At page 6 (R. 340), the 
following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: And do you understand the contents of 
that document? 
MR. VASILACOPULOS: Yes, I do. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the defendant 
understood the ramifications of his guilty plea. He has not 
demonstrated good cause why the trial court should have granted 
his Motion to Withdraw his guilty pleas or that in refusing to do 
so the court abused its discretion. 
This Court has previously addressed the question of an 
assertion by a defendant that he was not fully advised of his 
rights at the time of plea. The Supreme Court in Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985), and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 
310 (Utah 1985), held that precision was not required by the 
Court when complying with Rule 11(e). The Court in Warner, supra 
held: 
We find no merit to petitioner's claim. The trial 
judge followed the litany required by Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 11(e). U.C.A., 1953, 77-35-11 (1982 
ed.), except that in his question and answer session 
with petitioner, he did not ask specifically whether 
petitioner was aware that he had a right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, as required by Rule 
11(e)(3). Petitioner argues that this omission 
rendered his plea involuntary under Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238 (1969). Although the letter of Rule 11 
was not complied with, we find that the record as a 
whole affirmatively establishes that petitioner entered 
his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences and of the rights he was waiving, 
including his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 
310 (emphasis added). 
While the Morris case only specifically addresses the 
self-incrimination issue, the principle should also hold true in 
the context of defendant's claims. As is clear from the 
transcripts and affidavit involving his pleas, the record as a 
whole establishes that the defendant entered his plea with full 
knowledge of its consequences, including the possibility of 
consecutive sentences. 
This Court reaffirmed its holdings in Brooks and 
Warner, supra, in State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986). The 
Court said: 
* ^  
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by refusing to allow him to withdraw his 
guilty plea since he did not understand the nature of 
the charges against him or the consequences of his 
plea. In accepting a guilty plea, the court should 
find -[t]hat the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the 
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements.M U.C.A., 1953, 77-53-11(e)(4). In 
its memorandum decision denying defendant's motion, the 
court acknowledged it did not make a specific finding 
to this effect at the time the plea was accepted. We 
have held that the absence of a finding under this 
section [77-35-11(e)(4)] is not critical so long as the 
record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the 
defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the rights he 
was waiving. Brooks v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 310 
(1985); Warner v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 309 (1985). 
In the instant case, defendant has not supplied us with 
a transcript of the arraignment hearing where he 
entered his guilty plea or with any other evidence that 
the court failed to fully explain the consequences of 
the plea. If an appellant fails to provide an adequate 
record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity 
of the proceedings below. State v. Robbins, Utah, 709 
P.2d 771 (1985); State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 
(1982). 
Id. at 405. 
Again, while the Miller case did not deal specifically 
with the consecutive sentence issue, its reasoning is nonetheless 
applicable to the case before the Court. 
The defendant has cited State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987) as supporting his claim that his guilty pleas were 
improperly received by the trial court. That case did not 
overrule Miller, Warner or Brooks, supra regarding the record as 
a whole test to be applied in such cases, nor did it overrule 
Forsyth, supra, holding that no rigidity of rule is required, nor 
the Guglielmetti line of cases, supra, emphasizing the presumed 
voluntariness of a guilty plea given with the advice of counsel. 
There is no indication that it purports to set forth a 
new standard or that it overruled past cases on the same subject, 
2 i.e., receipt and withdrawal of guilty pleas. 
This becomes more evident in examining a holding of 
this Court since Gibbons. The Court in State v. Mildenhall, 
supra, held that the defendant had failed to show good cause why 
the trial court should have exercised its discretion to allow a 
withdrawal of the plea, and reaffirmed State v. Forsyth, supra, 
which stated that the court would not interfere with the trial 
court's ruling unless such abuse of discretion was shown, and 
that no rigidity of rule or procedure is required. 
Nevertheless, the procedure followed in taking the 
defendant's guilty pleas in this case was consistent with the 
holding in Gibbons. 
As noted by the Court in Gibbons, supra, the burden of 
establishing that Rule 11(e) is complied with and that the 
accused understands the plea procedure and its consequences is on 
the trial judge, who may meet this burden by the use of an 
affidavit signed by the defendant detailing his understanding of 
the plea, and/or by questioning the defendant. 
Evaluation of compliance with Rule 11(e) calls for a 
review of the entire record. Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 
2 
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 754 P.2d 41, 49, n.9 
(Utah 1988). 
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(Utah 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986); and State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 
337 (Utah 1977). In this case, the facts that Rule 11(e) was 
complied with and that defendant understood the plea process are 
demonstrated by reference to the plea affidavit, the transcript 
of the conversations between the trial judge and the defendant at 
the time the plea was entered and at the sentencing hearing, and 
by the defendant's extensive delay in even raising the issue. 
As indicated in the Statement of the Facts, the 
defendant failed to raise the claim of an allegedly involuntary, 
uninformed plea until June of 1986 in his habeas corpus civil 
action (R. 2-10 [V v. D]), more than two years after his guilty 
plea in February of 1984. 
Defendant's belated attempt to withdraw his guilty plea 
is obviously an afterthought borne of dissatisfaction with the 
court's sentence. This is not sufficient cause to warrant a 
finding of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. While it 
is true that Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 sets no time limit on 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, an undue delay in bringing 
such a motion should not be permitted. But cf. State v. 
Jaramillo, 481 P.2d 394 (Utah 1971). 
The issues of undue delay and its resultant prejudice 
were discussed by this Court in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 
1986) where this Court held: 
If we were to hold that any violation of Rule 11 
automatically voids the resultant plea, even when the 
plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced after 
such a plea, to attack their convictions for purely 
tactical reasons, either by direct appeal or by seeking 
habeas corpus long after the fact. We have refused to 
overturn convictions upon such challenges in the past, 
e.g.. State v. Knowles, Utah, 709 P.2d 311 (1985U 
State v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic]3 and 
we find no reason to encourage such attacks in the 
future. 
Overturning such convictions . . . would require 
the State to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably 
long after the challenged guilty pleas were entered and 
when the passage of time would make reprosecution 
impractical, if not impossible. Almost certainly, the 
ultimate result would be to free a number of convicted 
persons for nothing more than technical errors in the 
acceptance of their voluntary guilty pleas. 
Having concluded that violations of Rule 11 do not 
automatically invalidate Kay's guilty pleas, the 
question arises as to the consequences of Rule 11 
violations. Rule 30 of Utah's Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, U.C.A., 1953, S 77-35-30(a) (Repl. Vol. 8C, 
1982), reflects our "harmless error" rule, and we find 
it applicable to situations involving violations of 
Rule 11. Accordingly, a Rule 11 error will not 
invalidate the plea taken unless the error results in a 
substantial violation of a party's rights. 
Id. at 1301-1302. (Emphasis added.) 
Such are the circumstances in this case. The offenses 
to which the defendant pleaded guilty occurred in 1981. To now 
require the State to reprosecute this case might be impractical 
and impossible. The extensive delay in raising the issue of an 
uninformed and involuntary plea has never been addressed by the 
defendant and the Court of Appeals did not address the question 
in its opinion. 
The analysis applied by this Court in Kay, supra, is 
applicable to the facts of this case with respect to the issue of 
It is believed that the Court meant to cite Warner v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 
1985) since those cases refer to the withdrawal of guilty pleas 
and those cases actually cited do not. 
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harmless error. As this Court observed in that case, Rule 30 of 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to situations 
involving violations of Rule 11 of those rules, and a plea will 
not be invalidated unless the error results in a substantial 
violation of a party's rights. 
Assuming arguendo that the trial court did not, to use 
this Court's language in State v. Forsyth, apply Rule 11 with 
"rigidity of rule or procedure," the totality of the 
circumstances nevertheless demonstrates that the rights of the 
defendant were not substantially violated and his pleas of guilty 
should not be disturbed. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals suggested that 
they were not applying the "new" standards the Court of Appeals 
found this Court established in Gibbons but a less strict 
standard as represented by Warner, Brooks and Miller, supra. 
The Court of Appeals said: 
. . . [I]n State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court without acknowledging 
Warner, Brooks or Miller, effectively replaced the 
prior "record as a whole" test with a strict Rule 11(e) 
compliance test in accepting a defendant's guilty plea. 
. . . In the instant case, defendant entered his 
plea on February 17, 1984. Therefore the strict Rule 
11(e) compliance standard established under Gibbons in 
1987 does not apply. 
Id. at 94. 
While this reading of Gibbons by the Court of Appeals 
seems unduly rigid, particularly in light of this Court's 
subsequent holding in Mildenhall, supra, what is more troubling 
about the Court of Appeals' opinion is that while purporting to 
apply a "record as a whole" test, the Court of Appeals in fact 
applied a rigid, mechanical, unyielding test of Rule 11(e). The 
court held that the trial court failed to find that the defendant 
understood the possibility of consecutive sentences without 
acknowledging defendant's extensive delay in raising the 11(e) 
challenge, and without recognizing the advice of defendant's 
attorney and his argument at the sentencing hearing which 
clearly reflected defendant's awareness of the concurrent 
sentencing possibility. Indeed, the court's opinion gives only 
perfunctory mention of the sentencing hearing and presentence 
report, both of which clearly referred to the concurrent 
sentencing possibility. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court in State v. Plum, 378 P.2d 671 (Utah 1963) 
set forth the standard which those seeking to upset a guilty plea 
must meet: 
[T]he sentence in a criminal case is a final 
judgment and one who would set aside such a final 
order, must proceed as the attacker and has the burden 
of producing convincing proof of a fact which 
constitutes a legal ground for setting aside such 
sentence. The presumption of validity is strong. 
Id. at 671-672. The Court also said in ruling on defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea: 
It has not been made to appear that the accused 
entered his plea of guilty in ignorance of his rights, 
or that he was immature or illiterate, or that he was 
influenced unduly or improperly either by hope or fear, 
or that his plea was entered by reason of mistake, 
misapprehension or undue influence. And, it appearing 
that the motion was not supported by any allegations of 
fact the effect of which dictated that the trial court 
was required, as a matter of law, to grant the motion, 
we are led to the inexorable conclusion that no abuse 
of discretion has been shown. 
^d. at 673. 
The defendant likewise in this case has failed to show 
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6. 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the law in 
this case and did so in conflict with the decisions of this 
Court. 
The issues raised in this Petition are of considerable 
importance to the question of withdrawal of guilty pleas, and 
Plaintiff-Petitioner State of Utah respectfully urges this Court 
to issue a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED t h i s 1 *Hw day of A^4i>sT , 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON 
Chief, Litigation Division 
Assistant Attorney General 
STANLEY H. OLSEN 
AssistcHo/t Attorney General 
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APPENDDCA 
Acceptance of Mr. Carlton's own values 
reveals no serious inequity or abuse of 
discretion in the property distribution as 
far as he is concerned Although Mrs. 
Carlton might have some reason to com-
plain, she has not cross-appealed to chal-
lenge the trial court's award.1 The find-
ings show that the trial court considered 
each item of property. The premarital 
property was delineated and awarded re-
spectively to each party. Hers was as-
signed a total value; his was not Individ-
ual valuations of their premarital assets 
were not material since the ultimate issue 
was the equitable division of marital prop-
erty, not premarital property. 
Where the asset values claimed by appel-
lant at trial show he received an equitable 
share of the marital property and no clear 
abuse of discretion is otherwise proven, we 
ought to defer to the trial court's property 
distribution. The judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Jon C VASILACOPULOS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870291-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 3, 1988. 
Rehearing Denied July 19, 1988. 
Defe* dant appealed from order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho-
S. The property distribution is also eminently 
fair when reviewed on the basis of marital In-
come. The majority identifies a seven year 
marriage and acknowledges thai Mr. Carlton 
"earned over J100,000 00 gross annual income 
during most of the marriage." Their tas returns 
show trial his adjusted gross income ranged 
from a high of $117,000 to a low of 1&S.000. 
The parties maintained a frugal lifestyle, eaxept 
for regular business trips that were expensed 
through his CPA business. Most of the approsj* 
mer F. Wilkinson, J., was denied motion to 
withdraw guilty plea. The Court of Ap-
peals, Bench, J., held that record did not 
establish that defendant understood possi-
bility of consecutive sentences when he en-
tered plea of guDty. 
Reversed, convictions vacated, and 
matter remanded 
1. Criminal Law *=»1149 
Denial of motion to withdraw guilty 
plea will be reversed only when it dearly 
appears that the trial court has abused its 
discretion. U.CA.1953, 77-13-6. 
2. Criminal Law *~273.1(4) 
Trial court may not rely on defense 
counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy 
specific requirements of admonishing de-
fendant before accepting plea of guilty. 
U.CJL1953, 77-35-ll(e). 
J. Courts *»100(1). 
Where defendant entered his guilty 
plea prior to date of Supreme Court deci-
sion requiring strict compliance with admo-
nition requirements, the strict compliance 
standard did not apply and test for review-
ing efficacy of plea hearing was whether 
the record as a whole affirmatively estab-
lished that defendant entered his plea with 
knowledge and understanding of its conse-
quences. U.CJL1953, 77-35-ll(e). 
4. Criminal Law *»273.1(4) 
Defendant's statement that he had 
gone over affidavit with his attorney and 
understood the contents of that guilty plea 
affidavit and that he understood that be 
was waiving his right to trial, to confront 
witnesses, and to appeal to a higher court 
did not establish that defendant understood 
mately $700,000 of income earned during the 
marriage was invested in liquid assets. The 
court found an accumulation of only $223,000. 
I find it Inconceivable that the remaining $472." 
000 of income was spent by these two people for 
consumables during their short marriage. Mrs. 
Carlton was awarded no alimony. Her $114,-
000 property award, about which she has pot 
complained, appears fair, equitable and even 
generous to Mr. Carlton's side of the ledger. 
D I A T E v. VASILACOPULOS 
QUUTM rod n (vtMhApv iwi) 
Utah 93 
poasibQity of consecutive sentences, and 
guilty plea was thus bvalid. U.C.A.1953, 
77-85-11(6). 
James N. Barber (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Stephen 
J. Sorensen, Asst Atty. Gen., Stanley H. 
Olsen (argued), Asst Atty. Gen., for plain-
tiff and respondent 




Defendant Jon VasOacopulos appeals 
from a trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. We reverse and 
remand. 
Defendant was charged by amended in-
formation with twenty felony counts of 
theft by deception, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 7G-&-405 (1978). A prelimi-
nary bearing was held and defendant was 
bound over for trial on eighteen of the 
twenty counts. On February 17, 1984, de-
fendant entered a guilty plea to three of 
the felony counts, one second degree and 
two third degree, based on a memorandum 
agreement that the remaining counts 
would be dismissed and sentencing would 
be delayed until August 1984. Defendant 
executed an affidavit waiving his rights, 
acknowledging his guilt, and affirming the 
voluntariness of his plea. Defendant failed 
to appear for sentencing. The trial court 
issued a bench warrant, and one year later 
defendant was arrested. He was sen-
tenced to consecutive terms of incarcera-
tion for the three felonies and a total fine 
of $20,000. 
Defendant filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion of sentence in November 1985, a peti-
tion for habeas corpus relief in June 1986, 
a motion for resentencing in February 
1987, and a motion to withdraw his plea in 
September 1987. The court denied his mo-
tions and dismissed his petition. Defend-
ant filed a notice of appeal from the trial 
court's denial of his motion for resentenc-
ing, a petition for writ of mandamus, and a 
notice of appeal from the court's denial of 
his motion to withdraw his plea. The three 
actions were consolidated for appeal by or-
der of this Court 
(1] On appeal, defendant claims his 
guilty plea was involuntary and improperly 
taken by the trial court, and, therefore, the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to 
withdraw his plea. Utah Code Ann. 
{ 77-13-6 (1982) states, in part, "A plea of 
guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon 
good cause shown and with leave of court." 
The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea will be reversed only when it clearly 
appears the trial court has abused its dis-
cretion. Stale v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422 
(Utah 1987). 
Defendant argues the trial court abused 
its discretion by failing to comply with 
Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e) (Utah Code Ann. 
% 77-S5^11(e) (19B7)). Rule 11(e) states: 
The court . . . shall not accept [a plea of 
guilty] untD the court has made the find-
ings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does 
not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation, to a jury* trial and to confront 
and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him, and that by en-
tering the plea he waives all of those 
rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands 
the nature and elements of the offense 
to which he is entering the plea; that 
upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the mini-
mum and maximum sentence that may 
be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of con-
secutive sentences; and 
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(6) Whether the tendered plea U a re-
sult of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement and if so, what agreement 
has been reached. 
See also R.Prmc.DisLCir.Cta. 3.6. Defend-
ant claims the trial court failed to find he 
understood the nature and elements of the 
offenses and the possibility of the imposi-
tion of consecutive sentences, in violation 
of subsections 4 and 5 of Rule 11(e). 
In the companion eases of Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 809 (Utah 1985), and 
Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 
1985), the trial courts substantially fol-
lowed the litany required by Rule 11(e). In 
Homer, however, the court failed to ask 
defendant whether he was aware he had a 
right against compulsory self-incrimination. 
Similarly, in Brooks the court failed to ask 
defendant whether he understood he was 
waiving his right against self-incrimination. 
In both cases, the Utah Supreme Court 
held, "Although the letter of Rule 11 was 
not complied with, we find that the record 
as a whole affirmatively establishes that 
defendant entered his plea with full knowl-
edge and understanding of its conse-
quences and of the rights he was waiv-
i n g . . . . - Warner, 709 P.2d at 310; 
Brooks, 709 P.2d at 311. The Court re-
affirmed its decisions in Warner and 
Brooks in State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 
(Utah 1986). 
(2) Subsequently, in State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah Su-
preme Court, without acknowledging War-
ner, Brooks, or Miller, effectively replaced 
the prior "record as a whole'9 test with a 
strict Rule 11(e) compliance test in accept-
ing a defendant's guilty plea. In Gibbons, 
the Court remanded defendant's appeal of 
his guilty plea as defendant had failed to 
first file a motion to withdraw his plea, 
thereby disallowing the trial court the op-
portunity to address an alleged error. 
However, the Court retained jurisdiction 
over the case for any necessary future 
action and utilized the opportunity to issue 
"a statement of law concerning the taking 
of guilty pteas in all trial courts in this 
state. . . ." Id at 1311 In its statement 
of law, the Gibbons Court held, "Rule 11(e) 
squarely places on trial courts the burden 
of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 
11(e) requirements are complied with when 
a guilty plea is entered." Id Trial courts 
may not rely on defense counsel or exe-
cuted affidavits to satisfy the specific re-
quirements of Rule 11(e). Id. at 1313. 
Rather, with or without an affidavit or 
defense counsel's advice, the trial court 
must conduct an on-the-record review with 
defendant of the Rule 11(e) requirements. 
Id at 1314. 
(3) In the instant case, defendant en-
tered his plea on February 17, 1984. 
Therefore, the strict Rule 11(e) compliance 
standard established under Gibbons in 
1987 does not apply. See United Slates v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct 2579, 73 
LEd.2d 202 (1982); State v. Norton, 675 
P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) (when a new rule of 
criminal procedure constitutes a clear 
break with the past, it will not be applied 
retroactively). Rather, we will apply the 
Warner-Brooks test to determine whether 
the record as a whole affirmatively estab-
lishes defendant entered his plea with fuO 
knowledge and understanding of its conse-
quences, namely the possibility of the impo-
sition of consecutive sentences. 
[4] At defendant's change of plea hear-
ing, the trial court reviewed with defendant 
that upon his plea of guilty to three counts, 
the prosecution would dismiss the remain-
ing counts at the time of sentencing. The 
following exchange then occurred: 
la that your intent, air? 
Yes, Hia. 
Now have you gone over an affidavit 
with your attorney? 
Yes, I have. 
And do you understand the contents of 
that document? 
Yea, I do. 
And do you understand if you sign that 
you will be pleading guQty, as I have 
indicated to you? 
Yta 
You also understand that if you sign that 
you will be waiving your right to a trial, 
your right to confront the witnesses, 
your right to appeal to a higher court? 
ANDERSON r. 
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Yes. 
You also understand that if you were to 
go to trial in this matter you would not 
be compelled to take the witness stand 
and testify? 
Yes, I do. 
Are you presently under the influence of 
any type of alcohol or medication or nar-
cotics that would impair your ability to 
exercise your free consent? 
No, I am not 
Are you doing this of your own free will 
and consent? 
Yes, I am. 
Do you understand that these other 
counts, which I have read to you, will not 
be dismissed today, but they will be held 
pending until the date of sentencing? 
Yes, I do. 
How do you plead, sir? 
Guilty. 
You may proceed and execute your affi-
davit 
The trial court clearly failed to find de-
fendant understood the possibility of con-
secutive sentences. The state argues the 
record as a whole affirmatively establishes 
defendant's full awareness of such a possi-
bility. We disagree. The only record evi-
dence the state can marshal for its position 
is the pre-sentence report and recommenda-
tion submitted at the sentencing hearing 
which was held one and one-half years af-
ter defendant entered his plea. The record 
as a whole supports a conclusion that de-
fendant would only be subject to consecu-
tive sentences under certain conditions. 
Paragraph 7 of defendant's affidavit 
states, "I also know that if I am on proba-
tion parole, or awaiting sentencing upon 
another offense of which I have been con-
victed or to which I have plead [sic] guilty, 
my plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed on 
me. 
We conclude the record as a whole does 
not affirmatively establish defendant's full 
knowledge and understanding of the conse-
quences of his plea under Rule ll(eX5). 
Defendant has therefore satisfied his bur-
den of showing good cause under section 
77-1S-6. The trial court abused its discre-
BJUNKERHOFF Utah 9 5 
95 CUtmb App. 19S8) 
tion in denying defendant's motion to with-
draw his plea. In light of our conclusion, 
We do not reach defendant's other claim 
regarding Rule 11(e)(4). 
The trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea is re-
versed. Defendant's convictions are vacatr 
ed, and the matter is remanded for further 
Proceedings. 
DAVIDSON, and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
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Mont R. ANDERSON, Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff, Lena Brinkerhoff, and 
Mark J. Brinkerhoff, Plaintiffs and Re-
spondents, 
v. 
Elsie BRINKERHOFF, Golda B. Adair, 
Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Gould-
ing, and John Does I thru V, Defend-
ants and Appellants. 
No. 880122-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 9, 1988. 
Purchasers of property brought action 
to quiet title and for specific performance 
of contract The Sixth District Court, 
Kane County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered 
judgment in favor of purchasers, and ap-
peal followed. The Court of Appeals, Bill-
Wigs, J., held that (1) evidence supported 
finding that contract for sale of land had 
not been abandoned, but rather that vendor 
had waived strict compliance with contrac-
tual terms; (2) forfeiture provision of con-
tact was not self-executing; and (3) evi-
dence supported finding that subsequent 
deeds executed by vendor to other family 
Members were invalid because vendor 
APPENDIX B 
Rule lie UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or not 
context and shall not accept such a plea until the court has made 
the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by 
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to counsel 
and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial 
and to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he 
waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the 
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a 
prior plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, 
what agreement has been reached• 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any 
other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or 
the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be 
approved by the court. If recommendations as to 
sentence are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation 
as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
APPENDIX C 
Rule 3.6 UTAH RULES OP PRACTICE - DISTRICT AND 
CIRCUIT COURTS 
Upon entry of a plea of guilty to a criminal charge, before 
acceptance thereof, there must be substantial compliance with the 
following: 
(a) Admonitions to defendant. The court shall 
not accept a plea of guilty without first making 
certain that the defendant understands the following: 
(1) the nature of the charge; 
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence 
prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the 
penalty to which the defendant may be subjected, 
including any consecutive sentences, if given; 
(3) that the defendant has the right to 
plead not guilty, or to persist in that plea if it 
ha already been made, or to plead guilty; and 
(4) that if he pleads guilty there will not 
be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty 
he waives the right to a trial by jury, the right 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, 
the right against self incrimination, and the 
right to appeal a conviction. 
(b) Determining whether the plea is voluntary. 
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without 
first determining that the plea is voluntary. If the 
tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement, the 
agreement shall be stated and confirmed in open court. 
The court shall determine whether any force of threats 
or any promises, apart from a plea agreement, were used 
to obtain the plea. 
(c) Determining factual basis for plea. The 
court shall not enter final judgment on a plea of 
guilty without first determining that there is a 
factual basis for the plea, and that all requirements 
of law for acceptance of a guilty plea have been met. 
(d) Use of affidavit of defendant. The court may 
establish the foregoing requirements in the record by 
use of a written affidavit executed by the defendant 
before the court, the substance of which shall be in 
substantially the form as contained in the "Affidavit 
of Defendant" form. 
APPENDIX D 
Rule 30 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded, 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the records and errors in the record arising from oversight or 
omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such 
notice, if any, as the court may order. 
APPENDIX E 
Rule 43 RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RULE 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when 
there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, 
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be 
considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of appeals has rendered 
a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of 
the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a 
question of state or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of this court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for 
an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not 
been, but should be, settled by this court. (Emphasis 
added.) 
APPENDIX F 
UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Jon C. Vasilacopulos, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
No. 870291-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for 
Rehearing filed by the respondent. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondent's petition for 
rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 19th day of July, 1988. 
FOR THE COURT: 
ClerJK of the Court 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON - 3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
STANLEY H. OLSEN - 2466 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
-vs-
JON C. VASILACOPULOS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I ORDER FOR STAY OF 
REMITTITUR 
t Case No. 870291-CA 
Based upon motion of the State, good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 36(c) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, that the remittitur in the 
above-entitled case, State v. Vasllacopulos, in which this Court 
. - » ' » 
Rr-'.. 
•BE J.1 11 ?9'-18 
M l r;.:.iVlVtRfc- JUL22 jo? 
0 
«•• 
denied rehearing on July 19, 1988, be stayed for a period of 30 
days from the date of this order to allow the State the 
opportunity to file its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari before 
the Utah Supreme Court. / 
DATED this ^ I day of 3<^t(A , 1988. 
JUDGE, TJTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
This is to certify that I hand-delivered a copy of the 
foregoing ORDER FOR STAY OF REMITTITUR to the following this 21st 
day of July, 19881 
JAMES N. BARBER 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant Jon C. Vasilacopulos 
